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CONSIDERING A CIVIL ACTION
The View from the Bottomless Pit: Truth, Myth, and
Irony in A Civil Action
Jerome P. Facher*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Prelude to A Civil Action-Court Proceedings in Anderson
For almost nine years, Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. occupied some
or all of my attention as counsel for Beatrice Foods Company. Ander-
son was a personal injury tort case brought by thirty-three plaintiffs
against two "deep pocket" defendants, W.R. Grace & Company
(Grace) and Beatrice Foods Company (Beatrice). It was said to be the
first "toxic tort" suit for personal injury and deaths allegedly caused
by consuming water from contaminated town wells. Anderson was
filed in the Massachusetts Superior Court in May 1982 and was
removed to federal district court in June 1982, where it was assigned
to Judge Walter Jay Skinner. Reading the complaint in 1982 and the
material that accompanied it gave me a glimpse of the tangle of scien-
tific, technical, industrial, medical, and legal issues that the case pre-
sented, but in no way foreshadowed the magnitude and complexity of
the litigation which ensued. No one could have foreseen that there
would be a book, A Civil Action, about the litigation, a movie of the
same title, numerous television documentaries about the case, a text-
book about the court materials, and widespread academic interest in
* Jerome P. Facher is a senior partner and former Chairman of the Litigation Department
of the Boston law firm of Hale and Dorr LLP. Mr. Facher taught Trial Practice at Harvard Law
School for twenty-nine years and is a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers. He rep-
resented Beatrice Foods in the Anderson case and has written and lectured extensively on the
case, on civil procedure and trial advocacy, and on the book, A Civil Action.
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using A Civil Action and the Anderson case as a tool for teaching civil
procedure, or as the basis for a new law school course.
The Anderson complaint alleged certain chemicals disposed of or
deposited on each of the properties owned by Grace and Beatrice had
contaminated the groundwater, which thereafter traveled to the Wo-
burn town wells (which had closed in May 1979), causing deaths and
various injuries to the plaintiffs who had consumed the well water.'
The Beatrice property consisted of two separate parcels Beatrice had
purchased in 1979 and owned until 1983. Both parcels were west of
the town wells and separated from them by the Aberjona River.2 One
parcel consisted of fifteen acres of heavily contaminated vacant land
that was a superfund site ("the fifteen acres"). The other was a nearby
parcel to the southwest of the fifteen acres on which the buildings and
facilities of the John J. Riley tannery were located ("tannery pro-
perty"). The fifteen acres, and not the tannery property, was the focus
of the plaintiffs' complaint and the trial. However, the complaint did
not allege that Beatrice had used or disposed of TCE (as was alleged
against Grace), but only that chemicals "deposited" on the fifteen
acres (by unidentified companies) had contaminated the groundwater
and been drawn to the wells when they were pumping.'
After an enormous amount of pretrial discovery, trial began in
March 1986. The case was to be tried in three phases. The first phase
would determine whether each defendant had used and disposed of
the chemicals and whether contaminated groundwater from each
defendant's property had traveled to the wells before they closed in
1979. If the jury determined that these two essential prerequisites
were present, the next phases of the case would try the issues of injury,
medical causation, and damages.
1. The case involved five or more specific chemicals. For purposes of this Article (as it was
in the case), the principal chemical is trichloroethylene (TCE).
2. The Grace property was northeast of the wells and on the same side of the Aberiona
River as the town wells.
3. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for Injury, Wrongful Death and Injunction
(filed Mar. 7, 1983), Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3,
1982), reprinted in LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A DOCUMENTARY COM-
PANION TO A CIVIL ACTION 62, 72 (1999). Many of the court papers in Anderson have now
been collected in this new and valuable textbook authored by Professors Lewis Grossman and
Robert Vaughn of American University's Washington School of Law. [Please note: The actions
that form the basis of A Civil Action were brought by the plaintiffs against multiple defendants.
These actions were consolidated in federal district court and brought under a single docket num-
ber (Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S). Although it is Bluebook practice to provide only the first of multi-
ple case names in a consolidated action, the editors have provided the names of the specific
parties involved in the litigation matters referred to by Mr. Facher, to aid our readers in their
research. - Eds.]
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The first phase of the trial took seventy-eight days and ended in
July 1986. The jury deliberated for eight and a half days and returned
its special verdict (in the form of its answer to Special Interrogatory
No. 1), which exonerated Beatrice of liability.4 Judgment was eventu-
ally entered for Beatrice and was appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit. During the pendency of this appeal and before it
had been argued, a report concerning the tannery property, which had
not been produced in discovery, was fortuitously discovered by plain-
tiffs on file at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.' Based on
the nonproduction of the Yankee Report, plaintiffs moved to vacate
the judgment, first claiming newly discovered evidence under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(2) 6 and later changing theories to claim fraud, misrepre-
sentation, or other misconduct under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).'
After extensive briefing from both sides and three days of oral
arguments, Judge Skinner denied the motion to vacate, finding, under
Rule 60(b)(2), that the Yankee Report would not have affected the
outcome of the case and, under Rule 60(b)(3), that its nonproduction
did not prevent plaintiffs from fully and fairly presenting their case.
8
In fact, in some aspects, Judge Skinner found the report more favor-
able to Beatrice than to the plaintiffs.9
The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the motion to vacate to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,'" where it was
consolidated and argued with the first appeal from the judgment for
Beatrice following the trial." The court of appeals denied and dis-
missed the first appeal. This disposed of the case that had claimed
that the contamination of the wells had come from the fifteen acres.
As to the second appeal, the court reversed Judge Skinner's denial of
the motion to vacate. The court retained jurisdiction and remanded
the case to Judge Skinner for a special evidentiary inquiry to determine
4. See infra Part IV.
5. The report became colloquially known as the "Yankee Report." It had been prepared
for the John J. Riley tannery by the Yankee Environmental Engineering and Research Services,
Inc. (sometimes called YEARS) and concerned groundwater and other matters at the tannery
property.
6. Motion for Vacation of Judgment Entered for Beatrice Based on Newly Discovered Evi-
dence (dated October 8, 1987), Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D.
Mass. filed June 3, 1982).
7. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Opposition at 3-4 (dated Nov. 2, 1987),
Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982).
8. See Memorandum and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial (dated Jan. 22,
1988), reprinted in Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 127 F.R.D. 1, 7-11 (D. Mass. 1989)
(Appendix).
9. Id. at 7.
10. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988).
11. Id.
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whether the nonproduction of the Yankee Report had substantially
interfered with a possible plaintiffs' case based on the theory that the
contamination of the wells had come from the tannery property as
opposed to the fifteen acres.
12
Pursuant to the mandate of the court of appeals, Judge Skinner
held a twenty-three day evidentiary inquiry over a ten month period in
1989 and fully investigated the circumstances surrounding the non-
production of the Yankee Report and other matters. Judge Skinner
issued findings and decisions in July and December 1989. In his Final
Report, Judge Skinner concluded that there had been no substantial
interference with any "tannery case" and that no "tannery case" had
ever existed. Judge Skinner recommended that there be no new trial,
and that plaintiffs' counsel be sanctioned for violating Rule 11 and 28
U.S.C. § 1927 by bringing and continuing to prosecute a claim against
the tannery knowing that there had been no evidence of any use or
disposal of TCE by the tannery.'" In 1990 the First Circuit accepted
Judge Skinner's Final Report and recommendations, upheld the denial
of the motion to vacate, and affirmed the judgment for Beatrice. 4
B. The Book, the Movie, and Beyond
In 1995, the best selling book, A Civil Action, by Jonathan Harr
was published, followed about a year later by the paperback edition.
In 1998, the movie, A Civil Action, was released. The book was writ-
ten from the author's vantage point inside the plaintiffs' camp, where
he was privy to the plans, secrets, conversations, and confidences of
plaintiffs and their counsel.'" The book was not intended, nor was it
written, as a neutral or impartial portrayal of the merits of the litiga-
tion, the litigants, or their counsel. Sympathetic to the plaintiffs, the
book's account of the Anderson case is told almost entirely from the
plaintiffs' viewpoint with the plaintiffs' counsel as the main character
(if not the flawed "hero"), whose words, thoughts, actions, reactions,
and imaginings are central to the narrative and to the book's implicit
advocacy of the plaintiffs' viewpoint and the impression that the civil
justice system operated to thwart their claims.
12. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d at 932-33 (lst Cir. 1988). The district court later
referred to this claim or theory as the "tannery case" to distinguish it from the "fifteen acres
case," which had already been tried and finally disposed of by the court of appeals. See Ander-
son v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394, 397, 402 (D. Mass. 1989).
13. See infra Part III.G.
14. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1990).
15. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 493 (1995). All citations to A Civil Action are
from the hardcover edition published by Random House in September 1995. References to the
movie are to the version released in 1998 and available on video in July 1999.
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Although the movie has not achieved any enduring fame, the
book itself has become recommended or required reading at more than
fifty law schools and, in some schools, is the basis of a specialized
course in civil procedure. However, this carries with it the twin dan-
gers of using the book for a purpose for which it was not intended and
of encumbering an outstanding work of nonfiction with an academic
mission it has not sought and cannot achieve. Taken alone, A Civil
Action, although excellent reading, offers no independent legal schol-
arship, nor can its subject, the Anderson case, serve as a learning model
for civil litigation. Moreover, A Civil Action provides no valuable
insights into how complex cases are tried, how federal judges manage
such cases, or how the civil justice system works, nor does it reflect an
understanding of the significance of the important procedural events
that shaped the Anderson case. This lack of understanding and litiga-
tion insight, and the author's close association with the plaintiffs' case
(including the sympathetic reaction from the public), may well explain
some of the book's important omissions which, if corrected, would
have made A Civil Action and the overall impression it creates some-
what less one-sided, and somewhat more accurate.
This Article offers the observations, analysis, and commentary of
Beatrice's chief trial counsel about some of the important issues and
rulings in Anderson, the accuracy of the events reported in A Civil
Action, and the misimpressions created by the book's undoubted tilt in
the plaintiffs' direction. Wherever possible, this Article's effort to
balance the scales relies on court records, trial and hearing transcripts,
and on other actual trial materials in Anderson to present the relevant
facts and events in the context in which they arose.
With these facts and the materials in the record, the student,
professor, or practitioner can, in a lawyerly way, reach his or her own
conclusions about the important issues of the case, the viewpoint of
the book, and the operation of the civil justice system. Contrary to the
erroneous impression of justice gone astray created by the book and
movie, a complete and balanced view of the Anderson case reveals a
properly working civil justice system that afforded the plaintiffs, at
both the trial and appellate levels, with a full and fair opportunity for a
trial before a jury and full and fair appellate review of the jury's ver-
dict in Beatrice's favor.
1999]
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II. THE ROLE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
A. The Basic Misimpression
One of the egregious misimpressions fostered by both the book,
A Civil Action, and the movie of the same title, is that Judge Skinner,
an experienced and highly respected federal judge, was somehow
unfair to the plaintiffs and biased in favor of the defendants in his
conduct of the case. In fact, the record shows that he was neither and,
that on the key issues affecting the survival of the plaintiffs' case, the
plaintiffs repeatedly received the benefit of favorable rulings.
The movie's brief but unfair portrayal of Judge Skinner can be
excused as stemming from Hollywood's need to entertain and its dis-
interest in fidelity to the record. However, the book's misjudgments
have other roots in addition to its affinity with the plaintiffs' case.
The author was not a legal writer, nor did he have experience with the
judicial system or how judges manage and try complex civil litigation.
More importantly, he had been unable to discuss the case with Judge
Skinner because of the judge's proper observance of the code of judi-
cial conduct. Had an interview been possible about the judge's han-
dling of the litigation, the author would have better appreciated that
difficult role and better understood and respected the judge's actions
and decisions.
Although the movie may not be long remembered, the book will
have greater longevity, especially in law schools, where it may be
required reading or the basis for new courses. It would indeed be a
true injustice if the book's portrayal of Judge Skinner, however unin-
tentional, was not challenged as inaccurate and uninformed. It would
be equally unjust if the facts about Judge Skinner's handling of the
case and its key issues were not set down so that students, professors,
and practitioners who read the book are given a more complete and
balanced basis for reaching any conclusions about his judicial per-
formance.
B. The Rulings on Dispositive Motions
Although neither the book nor the movie represent fair or com-
petent evaluations of Judge Skinner's performance in Anderson, reli-
able guides exist that good lawyers and good students may recognize
and apply. First, the pretrial record and the trial transcript are the
best evidence of the overall fairness and competence with which Judge
Skinner presided over the case. Although, as in any case, some of the
trial judge's individual rulings can be debated, the record in Anderson,
[Vol. 23:243
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when viewed as a whole and in the context of the adversary system,
shows that the plaintiffs were treated fairly, that the trial was con-
ducted competently, and that Judge Skinner's rulings were even-
handed and often generous to the plaintiffs.
Even if the entire record is not reviewed, the same conclusion can
be demonstrated by reviewing Judge Skinner's rulings on key proce-
dural and evidentiary challenges in Anderson, especially those which
sought to prevent the plaintiffs' case from reaching the jury. These
rulings reflected not only Judge Skinner's understanding of the issues
and his knowledge of the plaintiffs' case, but his inclination to permit
the case to be considered by the jury.
The fundamental goal of every plaintiffs case is to reach the
jury, overcoming along the way all motions potentially fatal to the
case. In Anderson, that goal was particularly difficult because of the
legal, scientific, and factual obstacles the plaintiffs faced. Nonetheless,
on every attempt by the defendants to prevent the plaintiffs' case from
being decided by the jury, Judge Skinner's decisions were in the
plaintiffs' favor and preserved the plaintiffs' goal of reaching the jury.
Specifically, a Rule 11 motion was denied, 6 a summary judgment
motion was denied in substantial part, 17 and a directed verdict was
substantially denied. 8 None of these motions presented easy issues,
nor were they routine decisions made on routinely filed motions.
C. Other Crucial Rulings on Evidence and Procedure
Two other rulings, without which the plaintiffs' case against
Beatrice could not have reached the jury, were also decided in the
plaintiffs' favor. The first involved a highly suspect opinion attempt-
ing to establish the time period when TCE, found on the fifteen acres
in 1985, had first been introduced at that site. Because of the sub-
stantial time required for the groundwater to have reached the wells
before they closed in May 1979 and for sufficient consumption of the
well water to have allegedly caused the various injuries and deaths,
plaintiffs had to show that this time period was in the mid-1960s to
early 1970s. The necessary time period was supplied by plaintiffs'
expert, who, relying on little more than his observations of the fifteen
acres in 1985, transformed (and in effect backdated) those observa-
tions into an opinion as to the period of time that certain activities had
16. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1983). See infra Part III. A.
17. Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986).
18. See Memorandum and Order on Defendants' Motions for Directed Verdict (dated June
9, 1986), Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982),
reprinted in GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 3, at 612.
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taken place, namely the mid-1960s and early 1970s, which supposedly
resulted in TCE contamination in that period.19
This speculative and unscientific opinion-admitted over strong
objection and a motion to strike-was provided by an engineer who
had few, if any, relevant qualifications to perform the task of "back-
dating" TCE contamination of groundwater. He followed no estab-
lished scientific principles and, as Judge Skinner said, did little more
than "eyeball" the property. Although Judge Skinner was plagued
with doubt at his "hairbreadth decision," in which he had no particu-
lar confidence, 21 and characterized his ruling as a "very close one," he
nevertheless exercised his discretion in the plaintiffs' favor and
admitted the "expert" opinion despite the fact that it could not cor-
rectly be called "scientific".21 This decision prevented the entry of a
directed verdict against the plaintiffs, much to the jubilation of plain-
tiffs' counsel.22
The other key ruling Judge Skinner made in the plaintiffs' favor
dealt with the issue of foreseeability, an essential element of the plain-
tiffs' negligence claim. In order to reach the jury, plaintiffs had to
prove that the tannery's alleged disposal of TCE in the mid-1960s cre-
ated a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiffs. 23 To prove this critical
element, the plaintiffs had to show that the tannery knew or should
have known, twenty years before the trial, that the groundwater under
the fifteen acres would travel easterly toward the town wells that pro-
vided water to the plaintiffs. Obviously, no duty existed prior to
19. Trial Transcript Vol. 8 at 116-17, Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., Civ. A. No. 82-
1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982) [hereinafter Transcript].
20. Transcript, Vol. 74 at 67.
21. HARR, supra note 15, at 302. See Memorandum and Order on Defendant Beatrice
Foods Co.'s Motion for Immediate Entry of Final Judgment Under Rule 54(b) (dated Sept. 17,
1986), Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982),
posted at <http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/faculty/gore/index.html>. In this posttrial order
entering judgment for Beatrice on the jury's Special Verdict, Judge Skinner stated that he had
admitted the opinion "very reluctantly because [he] could see no foundation for the opinion."
He added that, even if the jury had found against Beatrice, he would have been obliged to grant a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In fact, the opinion was nonscientific, speculative, and
basically unreliable. Today it would be clearly excluded by Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Callahan, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and
a verdict would be directed for Beatrice.
22. The success of the argument that resulted in the admission of the expert opinion (and
later the denial of the directed verdict motion) prompted plaintiffs' counsel to congratulate his
co-counsel, Professor Charles Nesson of Harvard Law School, on getting the opinion in evi-
dence, "crowing gleefully" to him, "You were touching the old bastard's (Judge Skinner's)
brain." HARR, supra note 15, at 302. By contrast, however, A Civil Action mentions nothing
about Judge Skinner's Memorandum and Order, described in note 21, supra, stating that he had
erred in allowing the expert opinion in evidence and had been misled by one aspect of the
expert's testimony about conditions on the fifteen acres.
23. See, e.g., Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 341-43 (1928).
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1964, when the wells were not in existence. Even after that point in
time, it was highly doubtful that anyone knew or could have known
the usual direction in which groundwater flowed under the fifteen
acres, (which in fact was north to south, not west to east), much less its
direction as affected by the pumping of the town wells.
In another close question, Judge Skinner admitted a 1968 letter
from a well driller to John J. Riley that referred to the fact that the
static water table level at one of the tannery's production wells (PW1)
had been affected by another of the tannery's wells (PW2) and the
installation of town wells in the same general area. Later, in framing
special interrogatories to the jury, Judge Skinner thought that it was"arguable" that this letter could be treated as some notice after 1968 of
a foreseeable duty to consumers of well water.24 I strongly disagreed
with Judge Skinner's expansive interpretation of this letter, which
basically did not deal with groundwater flow or direction and was
written for an entirely different purpose. Without such interpretation
and the admission of the letter, there would have been no evidence of
foreseeability and the verdict would have been directed in Beatrice's
favor on the issue of negligence.
D. The Ruling Denying Beatrice a Continuance
In addition to these important rulings in the plaintiffs' favor,
Judge Skinner denied the one motion I most desperately wanted to be
granted-and the plaintiffs most desperately wanted to be denied-a
motion for a continuance of the trial date to provide more time to pre-
pare for the complex trial ahead. This critical plea for a trial continu-
ance was supported by my long, detailed, personal affidavit-some-
thing I had not done before nor have I since-which described the
enormous complexity of the case, the unbelievable quantity of techni-
cal, scientific, medical, and legal documents, the vast numbers of wit-
nesses and experts, the constant, continuous, backbreaking seven-day-
a-week labors for all counsel, and the stark reality that no counsel was,
or could have been, prepared to try the case as it then stood. 2' As my
affidavit made clear, if ever a trial lawyer needed the exercise of
24. Transcript Vol. 75 at 36.
25. See Affidavit of Jerome P. Facher In Support of Continuance of Trial Date on the
Ground of Fairness (dated Jan. 27, 1986), Anderson v. Cryovac Inc., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D.
Mass. filed June 3, 1982), reprinted in GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 3, at 501. The affida-
vit was submitted in support of the Joint Motion of the Defendants for Continuance of Trial
Date (dated Jan. 27, 1986). In addition, Beatrice made a separate motion for continuance with
the self-explanatory title, "Beatrice Foods Co.'s Motion for Continuance of the Trial Date
Because of Thirty-Seven Newly Identified Surprise Witnesses and New Evidence Given by Par-
tially Deposed (and Now Unavailable) Last Minute Hostile Witnesses" (filed Jan. 27, 1986).
1999]
Seattle University Law Review
judicial discretion in his favor, it was in connection with this motion
for continuance.
In a chapter entitled "Facher's Plea," A Civil Action describes the
efforts I made to obtain the continuance, the explanation for its neces-
sity, the opposition by plaintiffs, their insistence on keeping the trial
date, and my importunings before Judge Skinner.2 ' Nevertheless,
Judge Skinner (whom A Civil Action implies was guilty of favoritism
toward me) ignored "Facher's Plea," took heed of the plaintiffs' coun-
sel's opposition and the brave bluff that plaintiffs were ready for trial,
and denied my request for a continuance. 27 As A Civil Action reports it
(and the author was undoubtedly present), Judge Skinner's decision
resulted in glee and gloating in the plaintiffs' camp,28 even though, as
later events showed, they were in fact unready for trial themselves, but
desperate to maintain the trial date because of their financial circum-
stances. 29
E. Lessons to Be Taught by A Civil Action: Part One
In the areas that mattered most to the plaintiffs, and at every
important stage where the plaintiffs' case could have been dismissed,
Judge Skinner's fair, impartial, and even generous rulings kept the
plaintiffs "in the ballgame," kept the plaintiffs' case in court, kept the
trial date on track, and ultimately permitted a highly sympathetic
plaintiffs' case to be presented to the jury, which is where the plaintiffs
wanted it decided. A Civil Action neither appreciates this important
point, which would be instantly apparent to trial lawyers and trial
judges, nor makes any comment or observation that illustrates or even
26. HARR, supra note 15, at 269-72.
27. A Civil Action also incorrectly states that my "plea" for a continuance was made for the
purpose of putting financial pressure on the plaintiffs' counsel in the hopes that a long post-
ponement would leave plaintiffs' counsel in too much debt to proceed. Id. at 286. Nothing
could have been further from the facts. See infra note 29. The author acknowledged this error at
the time A Civil Action was published, knowing that I made the motion and affidavit solely
because of my need for a continuance in the interest of adequate preparation.
28. Id. at 273.
29. At this time, I was completely unaware that the plaintiffs were in serious financial
straits and might have been adversely affected by the continuance. In fact, both defendants had
been wholly deluded by the illusion, carefully created and nurtured by the plaintiffs' attorneys,
that the plaintiffs were well financed and able to match the defendants motion for motion, expert
for expert, test for test, and tactic for tactic. Indeed, they did so throughout the pretrial and trial
period. Not until A Civil Action was published was I aware that (according to the book) the
plaintiffs' attorneys had been preparing and trying the case on borrowed money and had been led
to the brink of financial disaster by unrestrained expenditures. Id. at 209-10, 320-22, 347-50,
417-18. See also infra note 87.
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recognizes the significance of Judge Skinner's key rulings favorable to
the plaintiffs that allowed the case to reach the jury.3"
Once given the case, the jury was free to decide in the plaintiffs'
favor, aided by the evidence and arguments marshalled by plaintiffs'
counsel. The jury deliberated for eight and one-half days, and
returned a Special Verdict for Beatrice based on the law and the evi-
dence. Although A Civil Action has the right to suggest disagreement
with that verdict and with the court of appeals' ultimate affirmance of
the judgment for Beatrice, there is no basis to suggest any judicial
unfairness or partisanship at the trial, nor did the plaintiffs ever make
any such claim on appeal. 1
Moreover, the unstated but clearly implied charge of judicial
partisanship is contradicted by the record of Judge Skinner's published
and unpublished decisions and rulings in Anderson, his outstanding
judicial record, his unchallenged reputation for competence and integ-
rity, and the court of appeals' recognition of his "incisiveness and
vigor" in carrying out the "thankless task" that had been assigned to
him, all of which demonstrate his fair and able handling of the case."
As the court of appeals stated in its final opinion affirming the judg-
ment for Beatrice, his findings were "sound, well-substantiated and
free from observable legal error.""
30. On the other hand, in addition to its overall unfavorable portrayal of the judge, A Civil
Action is not reluctant to criticize and editorialize about specific rulings by the judge thought to
be unfavorable to plaintiffs. See, e.g., HARR, supra note 15, at 369 (the judge's special inter-
rogatories "had the quality of a text that had been translated from English into Japanese and back
again... the answers were essentially unknowable"); id. at 477 ("Judge Skinner could have
challenged EPA policy... but he chose not to."); id. at 367 (proper exclusion of so-called (by
plaintiffs counsel) "killer document" and other irrelevant evidence). Nor is A Civil Action
reluctant to make its own inaccurate pronouncements about the law. See, e.g., id. at 192 ("legally
it did not matter who had contaminated the land"). A Civil Action also engages in criticism or
condemnation of the judge by the device of using the harsh words and thoughts of plaintiffs'
counsel, see infra at 265-66, a technique also applied to Beatrice's counsel or Beatrice's case. See
infra note 78.
31. In matters of evidence, Judge Skinner, on most occasions, showed patience, courtesy,
and fortitude in handling the plaintiffs' attempts to frame proper questions, lay proper founda-
tions, and introduce exhibits into evidence, and in permitting re-arguments. As Judge Skinner
noted during the trial, many of the frequent objections to plaintiffs' counsel's questions stemmed
from the fact that plaintiffs had insisted that they were ready for trial when in fact they were not.
HARR, supra note 15, at 301.
32. Seeinfraat260,266-67.
33. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 391-92 (1st Cir. 1990).
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III. THE RULE 11 DECISIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND
END OF THE CASE
A. The First Rule 11 Hearing
One of the most compelling ironies of the Anderson case was that
it began and ended with Judge Skinner's rulings and opinions on Rule
11, the federal rule permitting dismissal of cases not brought in good
faith or brought without adequate investigation. When the case
against Grace and Beatrice began, Grace filed a Rule 11 motion seek-
ing to have the case dismissed as having been brought against Grace
without a good faith belief that there was good ground to support the
pleading.34 Grace believed that a Rule 11 motion was appropriate
because, among other things, (1) the reports on which the complaint
was based revealed numerous industries surrounding the town wells
without specifying the actual source of the contamination; and (2)
there was no valid medical evidence that the chemicals involved
caused childhood leukemia. In addition, Grace referred to a statement
from a consultant employed by the plaintiffs that there was no link
between the chemicals in issue and leukemia.35
Beatrice did not join in Grace's Rule 11 motion because I
believed that it was not likely to be successful. I concluded that the
allegations of the complaint and the assurances of plaintiffs' counsel
would be viewed in a light most favorable to the injured plaintiffs
(who had received widespread and sympathetic publicity in a "high
profile" case) and that the judge would not, at such an early stage,
dismiss the plaintiffs' case under the Rule 11 standard.
The issue, however, was not free from doubt. As the record
shows, Judge Skinner treated the motion seriously and was prepared to
hold an evidentiary hearing in which plaintiffs' counsel was to testify
as to his compliance with Rule 11.36 In the end, after brief argument
and an abbreviated nonevidentiary hearing in which the plaintiffs'
counsel refused to testify, Judge Skinner deemed the plaintiffs' allega-
34. This was the standard for compliance with Rule 11 under the Federal Rules as they
existed in 1982. Rule 11 was amended in 1983 to require, among other things, that attorneys
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before signing pleadings. See Advisory
Committee Notes, FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 1983 Amendment.
35. See Motion by Defendant W.R. Grace & Co. d/b/a Cryovac Division to Strike the
Complaint and Amended Complaint and Dismiss the Action Under Rule 11 (dated Nov. 8,
1982), Anderson v. Cryovac Inc., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982), reprinted
in GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 3, at 115.
36. See Court's Order of Dec. 15, 1982, referred to in Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsidera-
tion of the Form of Demonstration of Compliance with Rule 11 (dated Dec. 23, 1982), Anderson
v. Cryovac Inc., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982), reprinted in GROSSMAN &
VAUGHN, supra note 3, at 122.
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tions sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 11 and denied
Grace's motion.37 The first Rule 11 decision had no further signifi-
cance for the case and was of no further interest until the A Civil
Action book appeared in 1995 and the movie in 1998.38
B. The Special Evidentiary Hearing Inquiry
and the Final Rule 11 Finding
Judge Skinner's second Rule 11 decision came in December
1989, more than seven years after the case was filed (and more than six
years after Grace's Rule 11 motion had been denied). That decision
was part of Judge Skinner's Final Report and recommendations fol-
lowing a special evidentiary inquiry ordered by the First Circuit con-
cerning whether the nonproduction of the Yankee Report substantially
interfered with a so-called "tannery case" which, to that point, plain-
tiffs had not pursued.a9 In that Final Report, Judge Skinner found
that plaintiffs' counsel had violated both Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. §
192740 by bringing and continuing a lawsuit against Beatrice, knowing
before suit, and at least by the end of discovery, that there were no
facts to justify any claim that the Riley tannery had used and disposed
of TCE and, thus, that there was no "tannery case." The legal and
factual significance of this important finding is ignored by A Civil
Action, which is one of the book's serious omissions.
The court of appeals opinion ordering the special evidentiary
inquiry arose out of plaintiffs' appeal of Judge Skinner's denial of the
Motion to Vacate Judgment under Rule 60(b)(3). In its opinion, the
court of appeals announced a never-before articulated interpretation of
37. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1983).
38. The book describes the first Rule 11 hearing fairly accurately, see HARR, supra note 15,
at 110-19, but the Rule 11 scene in the movie is wholly fictional except as to result. Judge Skin-
ner did not refer to Rule 11 as being so "arcane and obsolete" that he had to look it up. Nor did
he refer to the Rule II motion as a "no-brainer" and hear no argument. In fact, Judge Skinner,
like all federal judges, was fully familiar with the rule. At the hearing, he indicated that he had
taken an interest in the rule, suggesting that its lack of use had probably clogged the federal
courts. HARR, supra note 15, at 110-18.
39. Because of privilege and work product objections, the report had not been produced as
part of the tannery's document production, nor at a January 1986 deposition of the tannery's rec-
ord keeper. The plaintiffs had been offered an opportunity to compel production, but the plain-
tiffs' counsel, in his zeal to maintain the trial date, told Judge Skinner that the problem with
respect to documents demanded at the tannery record keeper deposition had been resolved. See
Hearing, January 14, 1986, Anderson v. Cryovac Inc., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed
June 3, 1982). Despite this fact, neither the objections to the production of the report nor any
previous practice or understanding of the parties as to production of tannery documents was con-
sidered by Judge Skinner to be sufficient to have justified nonproduction of the report. Ander-
son v. Beatrice Foods Co., 127 F.R.D. 1, 5-6, 7-11 (D. Mass. 1989).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) provides that any person who so "multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously" may be required to pay the additional costs generated.
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the term "misconduct" as used in Rule 60(b)(3), and a somewhat more
elaborate standard for vacating a judgment under that subsection of
the rule.4 ' Guided by this new interpretation and standard, the special
evidentiary inquiry was to determine whether there had been "deliber-
ate misconduct," as the court of appeals had newly defined it. If so,
the court would determine whether the "deliberate misconduct" had
"substantially interfered" with the development of a possible "tannery
case" based on the theory that there had been disposal of TCE on the
tannery property that had contaminated the groundwater and reached
the town wells42 (as opposed to the plaintiffs earlier theory, now fore-
closed by the trial and the dismissal of the first appeal, that the con-
tamination had come from the fifteen acres).43
The special evidentiary inquiry consumed twenty-three trial days
over the period from January 1989 to October 1989, and was in two
parts. The first part (January-July 1989), on the issue of "deliberate
misconduct" (as specially defined by the court of appeals), took sev-
enteen days and involved twenty-two witnesses and 236 exhibits. The
41. As stated in the opinion, the court of appeals put its own "gloss" on the term "miscon-
duct" as used in Rule 60(b)(3) and on the standard for vacating a judgment, including new pre-
sumptions and burdens of proof if "deliberate misconduct," a term of art, were found. The court
stated that "misconduct" must be "deliberate" and that any nonproduction that was not acci-
dental would be considered as deliberate. Misconduct that was deliberate then triggered a pre-
sumption of "substantial interference" in favor of the moving party, which the opposing party
had the burden to overcome by clear and convincing evidence. See Anderson v. Cryovac Inc.,
862 F.2d 910, 924-27 (1st Cir. 1988). As articulated by the court of appeals, the concept of
deliberate misconduct would include instances in which a lawyer had made a good faith judg-
ment about nonproduction which thereafter was ruled to be in error. Judge Skinner later referred
to the court of appeals' definition of deliberate misconduct as a "term of art" or a specialized
term that had been "artificially sanitized" by the court of appeals, and did not connote any bad
faith but only the difference between purposeful and accidental conduct. See Hearing, Nov. 14,
1989, at 49, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3,
1982).
42. Anderson, 862 F.2d at 924-27, 930-32. In addition to the complex "gloss" the court of
appeals put on Rule 60(b)(3), the order to hold an evidentiary hearing was one of the most sur-
prising results reached by the court. Evidentiary hearings on motions for new trial were and are
rare, especially where, as in Anderson, there had already been three days on which oral argument
had been heard on the Motion to Vacate and a detailed written opinion by the trial judge. See
Memorandum and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial (dated Jan. 22, 1988), Anderson
v. Beatrice Foods Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982), reprinted in
GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 3, at 417.
43. The report had been commissioned by John J. Riley in 1983, without advising his
counsel. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 127 F.R.D. 1, 5 (1989). The report itself stated that
its purpose was to determine the direction of groundwater flow on the tannery property when
Riley's own well was pumping and also to determine whether groundwater contamination, if
present on the property, was contributing to the contamination of Riley's production wells. See
Yankee Environmental Engineering and Research Services, Inc., Hydrogeologic Investigation of
the John J. Riley Tanning Company, Inc. at 1.1, reprinted in GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note
3, at 763. Neither the work commissioned by Riley nor the report itself had anything to do with
use or disposal of TCE.
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hearing produced almost 3,000 pages of transcript, as Judge Skinner
heard substantial evidence about the initiation, preparation, nature,
and purpose of the Yankee Report and the circumstances surrounding
its nonproduction, including the chaotic and crushing last minute dis-
covery burdens, the deposition of the Riley tannery record keeper, the
objections to producing the report, plaintiffs' failure to move to com-
pel, the understanding of the parties as to the tannery's responsibility
for producing tannery documents (such as the Report), and the testi-
mony of Beatrice's counsel about their contacts with the Report.
Judge Skinner also heard extensive evidence about conditions on
the fifteen acres, Riley's removal of soil, surface objects, and other
materials from parts of the fifteen acres, and the nature and chemical
composition of such materials. As he had at the trial, Judge Skinner
again permitted witnesses to testify to their observations about objects
and materials on the fifteen acres, such as scrap iron, truck bodies, and
certain reddish-brown "peatlike" material. In addition, although the
special evidentiary inquiry was supposed to be limited in scope, Judge
Skinner allowed the plaintiffs to raise the issue that Beatrice and others
had engaged in various alleged conspiratorial activities, including the
sale of the tannery, subversion of test well results, and removal of
materials from the fifteen acres.
At the second part of the inquiry in October 1989, the plaintiffs
had the benefit of the presumption that the failure to produce the
Yankee Report constituted "substantial interference" with the plain-
tiffs' case, and Beatrice had the burden to rebut this presumption by
clear and convincing evidence. Judge Skinner took seven more days of
evidence about the significance of the report, the chemical nature of
certain materials taken from the fifteen acres, and the plaintiffs'
attempt to reopen the closed fifteen acres case, including new expert
opinion on groundwater flow which contradicted plaintiffs' trial
expert, Dr. George F. Pinder.44
Judge Skinner even admitted and considered the nature and
alleged significance of some foreign material that plaintiffs' counsel
had secretly removed from the fifteen acres. In a last minute unsuc-
cessful attempt to connect TCE with the tannery, plaintiffs' counsel
44. The plaintiffs' new expert contradicted Dr. Pinder's opinion at trial that town Wells G
and H did not draw water from the Aberjona River. The new expert opined that at least 50% of
the well water was drawn from the river. A Civil Action makes no observation, nor provides any
comment (even from plaintiffs' counsel) about this surprising turn of events. The decision not to
call Dr. Pinder to testify about the alleged importance of the Yankee Report was argued by Bea-
trice's counsel as creating an inference that the lack of the report had not substantially interfered
with any alleged "tannery case." See Hearing, October 27, 1989, at 11-12, Anderson v. Beatrice
Foods Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982).
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removed material from the fifteen acres without the tannery's knowl-
edge, thereafter retaining it until it could be used as "evidence" sup-
posedly favorable to plaintiffs, along with the proffered testimony of
additional experts who had analyzed it.4"
C. The Court's Conclusions About the Yankee Report
and the Removal Activities
In the course of both parts of the special evidentiary inquiry,
Judge Skinner had reviewed all of the evidence about the nonproduc-
tion of the Yankee Report and the "removal" activities by Riley and
all of the strident accusations of alleged conspiracies and other charges
of misconduct against Beatrice's counsel. In addition, he had heard
evidence on the alleged significance of the report, including the plain-
tiffs' attempts to reopen the fifteen acres case. After the conclusion of
the first part of the inquiry, Judge Skinner issued his findings on
"deliberate misconduct" in July 198946 and, after hearings in October
on the issue of "substantial interference," he issued his Final Report in
December 1989, which contained his findings and recommendations.47
As to Riley's "removal" activities, Judge Skinner found that they
had no consequences as far as the case was concerned and were legiti-
mately connected to the drilling of test wells and other investigative
procedures.4" The evidence also showed that the removal had taken
place in the daytime (not secretly at night as the movie A Civil Action
depicts them) and in the presence or vicinity of the EPA official in
charge of the property.49 In addition, Judge Skinner found that the
material allegedly removed from the fifteen acres was not even tannery
waste, but another substance that had not come from the tannery.
Although the removal activities suggested some "deviousness on
Riley's part" or his "secretive disposition, '"50 they provided no evi-
dence of conspiracy nor of use of TCE by the tannery.5 ' Nor was
45. See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394, 400 (D. Mass. 1989); Hearing
Oct. 24, 1989, at 4-5, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed
June 3, 1982).
46. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 127 F.R.D. 1 (D. Mass. 1989).
47. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394 (D. Mass. 1989).
48. Anderson, 127 F.R.D. at 4.
49. The court noted the use of "a diesel front end loader and a dump truck in broad day-
light, with representatives of the EPA present on the property." Id. at 3.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Riley's "removal activities" were not only outside the scope of the inquiry ordered by
the court of appeals, but were of dubious relevance coming, as they did, two to four years after
the wells were closed in 1979 and having no relation to alleged TCE contamination which,
according to the plaintiffs' own expert opinion, was supposed to have resulted from "activities"
twenty years earlier. See supra at 249. In addition, the removal of materials from the surface of
the fifteen acres in 1983 provided no proof that the tannery had disposed of TCE in the mid-
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there any evidence that the tannery had disposed of tannery waste on
the fifteen acres or engaged in any alleged conspiracy to conceal it.
Furthermore, as to the material obtained illicitly by plaintiffs'
counsel, it was not found to be tannery waste, nor did it constitute any
reliable or persuasive evidence that the tannery ever used or disposed
of TCE" Finally, no evidence was found at the tannery site of the
existence of vinyl chloride, a breakdown product of TCE, thereby
demonstrating that TCE had not been introduced into the tannery
property.
Thus, the charges and accusations about the alleged significance
of Riley's so-called removal activities, the alleged "tannery waste"
found on the fifteen acres, and the numerous alleged conspiracies in
which Beatrice had supposedly engaged were all found to have no
merit whatsoever. In fact, the trial judge found that much of the tes-
timony given at the first part of the special evidentiary inquiry about
these matters was not credible. 3
Concerning the Yankee Report, Judge Skinner found that it
might have been helpful to the plaintiffs if they had any case against
the tannery, but that, based on plaintiffs' counsel's own pretrial inves-
tigations and discovery, there was never any tannery case to begin
with. These and other facts supported the finding that plaintiffs'
counsel had violated Rule 11 in continuing to prosecute a nonexistent
tannery case.
5 4
D. Lessons to Be Taught by A Civil Action: Part Two
A Civil Action's partisan viewpoint is especially evident in its dis-
cussion and reportage about the special evidentiary inquiry held by
Judge Skinner.55 The significance of many of the important facts and
conclusions about the special evidentiary inquiry are not explained,
commented on, or even described in A Civil Action. Although much is
made of plaintiffs' counsel's efforts to find witnesses and evidence for
the inquiry,56 no commentary emerges emphasizing the fact that the
plaintiffs charges about Riley's "removal" activities and the reckless
accusations of conspiracy were totally rejected even with the heavy
1960s as the plaintiffs' alleged expert had opined. Furthermore, any chemical contamination
found in the soil on or near the surface of the fifteen acres would have demonstrated recent con-
tamination, which conclusion would have been favorable to the defendants, not the plaintiffs.
52. Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 400-01.
53. See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co. 129 F.R.D. 394 (D. Mass. 1989); Anderson v.
Beatrice Foods Co., 127 F.R.D. 1, 3-4 (D. Mass. 1989).
54. See infra Part 11I.G.
55. See HARR, supra note 15, at 469-89.
56. Id.
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burden of proof that had been imposed on Beatrice. Also ignored is
the significance of the startling conclusion that no "tannery case" ever
existed, and the plaintiffs' counsel's precomplaint knowledge of that
fact.57 In addition, A Civil Action makes no mention of Judge Skin-
ner's tolerance in admitting irrelevant evidence that was outside the
scope of the special evidentiary inquiry and would have been excluded
in any other circumstances.
58
Nor is there mention of the significance of the events concerning
Judge Skinner's appointment of a neutral expert to conduct tests to
determine the presence of TCE on the tannery property. Had TCE
been found, this would have provided powerful evidence in the plain-
tiffs' favor. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' counsel staunchly opposed
and objected to this procedure and, eventually, the order for a neutral
expert was withdrawn because of the expense and the amount of time
the tests would have taken. Significantly, A Civil Action fails to note
the serious contradiction between the plaintiffs' constant assertions
that they had been denied an opportunity to test the tannery property
for TCE and their objections to the appointment of a neutral expert to
do the very tests they claimed should have been carried out.
Finally, Judge Skinner's Final Report and related events are so
compressed and consolidated in A Civil Action that little emerges other
than the viewpoint that the plaintiffs were somehow thwarted by the
judge or the system. 9 Thus, despite the detailed and exhaustive series
of evidentiary hearings, two written opinions by Judge Skinner, the
nonexistence of any "tannery case," and the definitive rejection of the
plaintiffs' baseless accusations of conspiracies, A Civil Action still
leaves the impression that the plaintiffs were unfairly treated, an
impression that itself is unsupported and unfair, and reflects a lack of
regard and understanding for the workings of the civil justice system.6 °
57. See infra at 263.
58. A Civil Action also suggests, through the forceful remarks of plaintiffs' counsel, that the
judge deliberately intended to injure the plaintiffs case. HARR, supra note 15, at 356, 452.
59. This rush to judgment never pauses to criticize any improprieties by plaintiffs' counsel
during the special evidentiary inquiry, such as use of an invalid witness subpoena, see id. at 479,
or improperly obtaining "evidence" from the fifteen acres. See supra at 257. Nor do the earlier
chapters of A Civil Action make any direct criticisms about other similar conduct. See, e.g., id. at
98 (improper pretrial publicity); id. at 220-21 (improper deposition conduct). Furthermore, A
Civil Action omits entirely any report, description, or comment concerning the unauthorized and
improper revision of an amicus curiae brief to launch a personal attack on Beatrice's counsel, an
action that drew a public apology from the group acting as amicus, and the withdrawal of the
brief from the court of appeals. See 16 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 1197, at 23 (April 4, 1988);
BOSTON GLOBE, March 25, 1988, at 74; BOSTON HERALD, March 28, 1988, at 2; WOBURN
TIMES-CHRONICLE, March 20, 1988, 2A at 1.
60. See infra Part VI.
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Overall, A Civil Action wholly fails to recognize or credit Judge
Skinner's competence and fairness in conducting the special eviden-
tiary inquiry, his careful consideration of the evidence, his well-sup-
ported findings of fact, and his carefully written and detailed Final
Report, which was affirmed by the court of appeals. Moreover, Judge
Skinner's conduct of the special evidentiary inquiry reflects the com-
petence, restraint, and thoroughness with which he handled the entire
case. His findings and decisions at the special evidentiary inquiry not
only revealed that the plaintiffs had no evidence that the tannery used
or disposed of TCE, but served to reaffirm the correctness of the
jury's Special Verdict rendered three and one-half years earlier to
exactly the same effect.
E. The Refusal of Plaintiffs' Counsel to Testify at the Inquiry
The special evidentiary inquiry ordered by the First Circuit
envisaged that the district court would receive evidence from the
defendants' counsel about their contacts with the Yankee Report and
that there would be evidence from the plaintiffs on how and why the
nonproduction of the report had substantially interfered with an
alleged "tannery case." Consistent with this expectation, my partner
and I each took the stand during the first part of the special eviden-
tiary inquiry (dealing with nonproduction) and testified fully under
oath about our contacts with the report. In addition, I had previously
filed a lengthy and detailed response to the court's order for a state-
ment of position concerning the nondisclosure of the report and any
knowledge of materials removed from the fifteen acres. 1  After my
testimony at the inquiry was completed, plaintiffs' counsel never
attempted any cross-examination about the report, the sworn state-
ment previously filed, the so-called removal activities by Riley, the
various "conspiracies" alleged by plaintiffs' counsel, nor any other
issue concerning the fifteen acres or the tannery.
Not only did plaintiffs' counsel fail to challenge any part of my
testimony, but when the special evidentiary inquiry reached the cru-
cial issue of "substantial interference," namely, how or why the non-
production of the Yankee Report had substantially interfered with
plaintiffs' alleged "tannery case," plaintiffs' counsel refused to take the
stand to testify on this issue or to substantiate the accusations of mis-
conduct that had been made against Beatrice's counsel.62 Claiming
61. Statement of Jerome P. Facher in Response to Court Order of December 22, 1988
(dated January 26, 1989), Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass.
filed June 3, 1982), reprinted in GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 3, at 440.
62. Throughout the entire Special Inquiry, the plaintiffs made 31 motions, most of them
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lawyer-client privilege as the basis for his refusal, no such testimony
was ever given by plaintiffs' counsel.6"
F. Lessons to Be Taught by A Civil Action: Part Three
The failure to challenge or rebut the testimony of Beatrice's
counsel at the special evidentiary inquiry and the failure of plaintiff to
testify might well have justified an inference as to the invalidity of the
claims and accusations that the plaintiffs' counsel had made. Based on
such an inference and the limited credible evidence from plaintiffs,
Judge Skinner could have reached the conclusion that plaintiffs had
failed to sustain their ultimate burden, which was to prove that the
nonproduction of the Report had "substantially interfered" with an
alleged "tannery case." Nonetheless, A Civil Action never explains or
even comments on plaintiffs' counsel's failure to cross-examine or to
testify, although it finds space to suggest an adverse impression about
the expected and necessary testimony from Beatrice's trial counsel by
employing the trivial observation of one of plaintiffs' attorneys that
the procedure was somehow "surreal" or otherwise inappropriate.
64
Finally, regardless of the inference, if any, to be drawn from the
plaintiffs' counsel's refusal to testify and his failure to cross examine
Beatrice's trial counsel, the fact remained that Judge Skinner had
received no sworn evidence from plaintiffs' counsel-a highly impor-
tant witness with supposed first-hand knowledge-to support the
filled with rhetorical excess and indignation, alleging all manner of conspiracies and seeking
extreme sanctions, including three motions seeking general default, five motions seeking inquir-
ies or investigations, two motions to disqualify Beatrice's counsel, and a variety of others for
sanctions, for Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) relief, for estoppel, for directed findings and for a restraining
order. The opportunity to prove these allegations and to provide evidence instead of rhetoric and
testimony instead of accusations was afforded to plaintiffs' counsel (if not expected by the court
of appeals and the district court) at the twenty-three day Special Inquiry, but such testimony was
never forthcoming even though the trial judge had suggested, but not required, that it should be
given as part of plaintiffs' counsel's burden. See Hearing Oct. 27, 1989, at 6-9, Anderson v.
Beatrice Foods Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982).
63. Any such privilege had likely been waived because the plaintiffs had put in issue the
alleged interference with their case and could not assert privilege to foreclose inquiry about that
issue. See Connell v. Bernstein-Macaulay, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 420, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(holding privileged communications waived where plaintiff injected issue about his claimed rea-
sons for not filing suit). In any event, there is no doubt that any lawyer-client privilege had
clearly been waived by the plaintiffs' permitting and encouraging the author of A Civil Action to
sit in on and to share their plans, strategy, and confidences. See HARR, supra note 15, at 493.
Nevertheless, A Civil Action takes no note of this unusual decision which might have had serious
legal and tactical consequences.
64. See HARR, supra note 15, at 483. In addition to its general partisan viewpoint, A Civil
Action contains numerous cameo observations, characterizations or editorializations which are
unfavorable to Beatrice or favorable to plaintiffs. See, e.g., id. at 345, 357, 362. See also infra at
265-66.
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accusations, so fearlessly stated in unsworn papers, that the plaintiffs'
alleged tannery case had been substantially impaired by Beatrice's
"conspiracies" or other alleged improper conduct. On this point, the
silence of A Civil Action clearly testifies to its steadfast leanings in the
plaintiffs' direction.
G. The Court's Conclusion That Rule 11 Had Been Violated
Consistent with his mandate from the court of appeals to conduct
an aggressive investigation, Judge Skinner, rebuffed by plaintiffs'
counsel's refusal to testify, looked to other basic sources of information
to determine whether the lack of the Yankee Report had substantially
interfered with the plaintiffs' alleged "tannery case." Lacking direct
testimony from plaintiffs' counsel, Judge Skinner ordered him to sub-
mit his investigative file to be examined in camera, not to be shown to
Beatrice's counsel.
The result of the court's examination of the plaintiffs' investiga-
tive files was electrifying and, to this day, unprecedented in its revela-
tions and results. The court found that the plaintiffs' own
investigators had been unable to provide evidence or witnesses to sup-
port the claim-at the heart of the plaintiffs so-called "tannery
case"-that the tannery had used and disposed of TCE. Even more
startling was the revelation that the plaintiffs' investigators, who had
interviewed dozens of people, including chemical suppliers, tannery
employees, ex-employees, residents and former residents living near
the tannery, and others, had provided plaintiffs' counsel affirmative
direct evidence that TCE had not been used by the tannery.6" All of
the many employees and former employees of the tannery interviewed
by plaintiffs' investigators stated that they knew of no use of TCE at
the tannery.66 In fact, in April of 1985, one supplier of industrial
chemicals had told the plaintiffs' investigator that the complaint
chemicals "do not belong in the leather industry."67
From this critical evidence and his detailed knowledge of the
case, Judge Skinner made important factual findings. He concluded
that plaintiffs' counsel had pressed his claim of tannery disposal of
complaint chemicals
[n]otwithstanding the fact that his own investigative file contained
no support whatsoever for the claim of disposal of the complaint
65. In addition, in pretrial discovery, plaintiffs had deposed more than a dozen witnesses
on tannery operations and use of chemicals including employees, ex-employees, waste haulers,
and suppliers of chemicals. No evidence was found that the tannery used TCE.
66. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394,399 (D. Mass. 1989).
67. Id.
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chemicals at the tannery site, or by the tannery on the 15 acres, and
significant positive evidence to the contrary.68
In addition, Judge Skinner stated that:
at the time of the commencement of the trial, throughout the trial
and at the time that plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was filed,
plaintiffs' counsel knew that there was no available competent
evidence tending to establish the disposal of complaint chemicals by
the defendant itself, either at the tannery site or on the 15 acres.69
As to any possible new trial based on any "tannery case," Judge
Skinner found that:
The chance that a viable "tannery case" could be developed in any
further proceedings is virtually nonexistent, even if the plaintiffs
were entitled to try. In my opinion, a new trial on the issue of the
pollution of wells G and H resulting from disposal of the complaint
chemicals at the tannery site would be pointless, wasteful and
unwarranted."o
In light of these and other similar findings, Judge Skinner also
concluded that there had been a misrepresentation to the court about
the basis of a "tannery case."
Plaintiffs implicitly and explicitly represented at trial and through
these extensive post-trial proceedings that there was a basis in fact
for the assertion that the defendant disposed of the complaint
chemicals at the tannery site or on the 15 acres. At least by the close
of his investigation and discovery, however, plaintiffs' counsel knew
that there was no such basis in fact. Continued prosecution of the
claim at that point was a violation both of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and
28 U.S.C. sec. 1927.zl
Finally, these dramatic findings about the plaintiffs' lack of any
evidence to support a "tannery case" were succinctly highlighted in
Judge Skinner's last ironic footnote to his Final Report:
More latitude should be allowed at the beginning of a case for a
claim based on information and belief, but so far as appears
plaintiffs did not have even the benefit of rumor, whisper, or even
an anonymous tip. The entire exercise was apparently purely for
forensic advantage.72
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
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Having presided over years of discovery, a full seventy-eight day
trial, three days of oral argument on the new trial motion, and a
twenty-three day special evidentiary inquiry, Judge Skinner had
amassed a detailed knowledge of the case and had overwhelming sup-
port for his finding that the plaintiffs had violated Rule 11 and 28
U.S.C. § 1927 by bringing or continuing to prosecute any so-called
"tannery case" against Beatrice when there was no evidence to support
it.73 Although unusual in its timing because it came at the end of the
case, Judge Skinner's Rule 11 finding was rooted in the facts, espe-
cially those contained in the plaintiffs' own investigative files which
revealed that there never had been any "tannery case." To bring or to
continue to prosecute that nonexistent case was indeed a Rule 11 vio-
lation, as Judge Skinner found.74
H. Lessons to Be Taught by A Civil Action: Part Four
Although A Civil Action devotes much attention to the first Rule
11 hearing, which ended favorably for the plaintiffs,75 it offers no
similar treatment of the final Rule 11 decision, which was highly unfa-
vorable to the plaintiffs. Nor does A Civil Action offer any direct or
indirect observations on the importance of Judge Skinner's careful,
detailed findings about the plaintiffs' lack of a tannery case or coun-
sel's conduct in prosecuting that nonexistent case.76 Instead, A Civil
Action chooses to demean and trivialize the significance of Judge Skin-
ner's final Rule 11 decision by the unstated but clear suggestion that it
was the product of an irrational judge determined to end the case and
thwart the plaintiff.77
73. The Rule 11 denial at the beginning of the case took place under the 1982 version of the
rule, which required only a good faith belief by counsel that there was good ground to support
the pleading. At the time of the final Rule II decision in 1989, the rule had been further
amended to add the requirement, among other things, that counsel make a reasonable inquiry of
the facts and law before filing the complaint. In 1993, Rule 11 was again amended, this time to
reduce the excessive litigation caused by the 1983 amendments. In the 1993 version of the rule, a
party seeking a Rule 11 sanction was required to bring a claimed Rule 11 violation to the atten-
tion of the offending party, who then had a 21 day period, or "safe harbor," in which to withdraw
the material claimed to violate the Rule. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
74. Judge Skinner imposed no additional sanction against the plaintiffs, but off-set the
plaintiffs' Rule 11 violation against the defendants' nonproduction of the report, noting that "the
honors for sanctionable conduct are about evenly divided." Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 403. The
court of appeals adopted Judge Skinner's recommendations, which included denial of the plain-
tiffs' numerous accusatory motions, and affirmed the judgment for Beatrice. Anderson v. Bea-
trice Foods Co., 900 F.2d. 388, 396 (1st Cir. 1990).
75. HARR, supra note 15, at 107-19.
76. The movie A Civil Action fictionalizes the first Rule 11 hearing and then totally ignores
the special evidentiary inquiry, the final Rule 11 decision, and the trial judge's conclusion that
the plaintiffs never had any case against the tannery.
77. See, e.g., HARR, supra note 15, at 487.
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This impression is created, as are other similar impressions
adverse to the judge and to the defendants, by viewing the event or
incident through the eyes, mind, thoughts, and words of plaintiffs'
counsel, and by using his quoted statements to suggest, however
implicitly or subliminally, the validity of those impressions." With
respect to Judge Skinner's finding of a Rule 11 violation, A Civil
Action makes no comment of its own but chooses only to report plain-
tiffs' counsel's disrespectful remarks: "The man is demented ....
The man is a f. ..... monster. I know the joy of a madman. He says
I should be sanctioned."79
A Civil Action provides no balancing quotation or observation to
temper or challenge the tone and tenor of these rash remarks or the
impression that Judge Skinner has acted unfairly and irrationally.
Equally significant, A Civil Action provides no facts to refute Judge
Skinner's findings, which are the foundation of his Final Report to the
court of appeals.
Having had plaintiffs' counsel adversely pronounce judgment on
Judge Skinner's decision, A Civil Action makes no further mention of
it and, in a rush to conclusion, completes its unbalanced portrait of the
postinquiry proceedings, pausing only to note briefly that the court of
appeals upheld all of Judge Skinner's findings, adopted his recom-
mendations, and commended him for his efforts carried out in a
"thankless task."" °  Even the basic fact that the court of appeals
affirmed the judgment that had been entered for Beatrice almost three
years earlier after the jury's Special Verdict is omitted.
It is regrettable that A Civil Action does not reflect an adequate
understanding of the judge's role in Anderson or his significant finding
that a Rule 11 violation had occurred because no case against the tan-
nery had ever existed. It is even more regrettable that A Civil Action
78. This is a technique found elsewhere in A Civil Action. For example, on whether Bea-
trice's counsel had an ex parte contact with the judge, the book quotes plaintiffs' counsel's obses-
sive imaginings to this effect without including any fact, comment or quote to the contrary, id. at
224, and with the knowledge that no such contact ever took place. On the nonproduction of the
Yankee Report, the book again uses plaintiffs' counsel's thoughts to improperly suggest impro-
priety. See id. at 315, 345, 460. Other thoughts of plaintiffs' counsel accomplish the same effect
as to other subject matters. See id. at 315, 345; see also supra note 58. In addition, A Civil Action
has no hesitation in suggesting (incorrectly) an alleged familiarity and affinity between Facher
and the judge which, in fact, had not existed. See Memorandum on Motions of John J. Riley et
al. and Attorney Mary Ryan for Reconsideration and Motion of Attorney Ryan to Participate in
Hearings on Sanctions, at 3 n.1 (Dec. 4, 1989), Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., Civ. A. No. 82-
1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3,1982), reprinted in GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 3, at 472.
79. HARR, supra note 15, at 487.
80. Id. at 488. The book devotes only ten pages of its five hundred pages to the entire 23-
day inquiry (held over a ten month period), Judge Skinner's interim and final reports, and the
court of appeals' affirmance of the judgment for Beatrice. Id. at 477-87.
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fosters the overall unfair impression that the plaintiffs had been
thwarted by the judge and the civil justice system, especially where
there was much evidence to the contrary, including (1) a jury decision
which found that Beatrice was not liable to the plaintiffs, (2) a Final
Report which, after an exhaustive special inquiry, found that no tan-
nery case existed, and (3) a court of appeals decision that confirmed
Judge Skinner's findings and affirmed the judgment for Beatrice.
In these circumstances, A Civil Action might well have paid some
heed to the thought that its unshaken partisan view of the case,
although likely to be popular, was not one which the Anderson record
and fair minded students and lawyers would support. Furthermore,
for the student or lawyer who pursues the truth, Judge Skinner's
findings, popular or not, were supported by the evidence and were not
to be lightly dismissed, glibly overlooked, or silently rejected.
IV. EFFECTIVE AND FAIR CASE MANAGEMENT: THE DECISION
TO TRY DISPOSITIVE ISSUES FIRST
A. The Need to Adopt a Trial Plan to Fit the Case
As of the early 1980s, the Anderson case was one of the most
complex pieces of civil litigation ever to face a federal judge, and it
presented an enormous case management challenge. The case had
thirty-three plaintiffs (including the executors of five deceased chil-
dren), who charged that two corporate defendants each: (1) had used
and disposed of specific chemicals on their properties, which (2) had
reached the ground water and (3) had traveled in the groundwater to
certain town wells (4) in quantities sufficiently substantial to contami-
nate the wells, which (5) had distributed the contaminated water to the
plaintiffs, (6) who consumed or were exposed to sufficient quantities
(7) to cause serious physical and mental injuries of almost every type
and description.
In addition to the legal issues presented by the various amended
complaints, the case involved complex and diverse issues, including
hydrology, hydrogeology, geology, soil chemistry, water distribution,
leather making, waste disposal, engineering, computer modeling, sta-
tistics, environmental history, industry practices, well drilling,
groundwater flow, industrial injuries, cardiology, immunology,
hematology, epidemiology, psychology, neurology, oncology, psychi-
atry, pathology, and more.
Although I had tried numerous complex cases before Anderson,
none had involved such a large number of parties, witnesses and
experts, such a broad diversity of scientific, technical, medical, and
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legal issues, and such an immense mass of discovery and trial
preparation materials. These complex issues created unbelievably
enormous discovery burdens, including endless depositions and
document requests which were a nightmare for all counsel and a never
ending source of court papers, motions, objections, and court appear-
ances.
As the time of trial approached, there were hundreds of deposi-
tion transcripts, with an even greater number of exhibits. There were
dozens of expert reports, hundreds of medical reports and tests, and
tens of thousands of pages of scientific, medical and technical articles,
reports, records, and studies, as well as a vast array of other materials.
Inundated by these materials, I estimated they would have made a
paper mountain as high as a three-story building, and that such an
enormously complex case might consume a year or more in trial.
Judge Skinner was not only aware of the overwhelming complex-
ity of the Anderson case, but also that it was high profile litigation that
had generated much pretrial public sympathy. He perceived that
there was a real danger that justice could not be served if the out-
pouring of sympathy and emotion that surrounded the case were per-
mitted to prevent its orderly presentation or to obscure or replace the
scientific facts which were a necessary prerequisite to liability.
No judge faced with this gigantic case, its mountain of eviden-
tiary and documentary materials, and the danger of having emotion,
not evidence, decide the issues, could fail to take proper steps to
organize, simplify, and make fair and manageable an otherwise
unmanageable trial. No judge could allow this case to run amok, nor
tolerate the hopeless confusion in which a jury would find itself if pre-
sented with a mammoth unstructured mass of complex medical, sci-
entific, and technical evidence together with lay testimony, all in an
atmosphere rife with sympathy for the plaintiffs.
Although dividing a case into liability and damages is a common
judicial technique for efficient case management, such bifurcation
alone would not have sufficed in Anderson because any separate trial
on liability would still have involved the liability claims of thirty-three
plaintiffs and would still have raised all of the complex scientific,
medical, and technical issues. Moreover, the facts of each plaintiffs
claim differed as to injury, causation, and personal circumstances,
such as age, health, exposure to water, and other matters.
Faced with a challenging problem of trial management, Judge
Skinner requested and received from the parties their proposals for a
trial plan to manage and try the case. These proposals were thor-
oughly explored and argued. The plaintiff argued for a so-called
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"model trial" or "test case" that would try one plaintiffs case, Anne
Anderson's, to completion on liability and damages with the findings
and results in that case to be applied in some way to every other plain-
tiff's case to the extent possible.81
The plaintiffs' plan seemed likely to be unworkable because the
plaintiffs had brought thirty-three separate claims with different inju-
ries, damages, and proof requirements for each claim. Given the dif-
ferent legal, factual, and medical circumstances of each plaintiff,
substantial time and effort could be wasted in one "test case" without
providing a clear result that could be applied and enforced as to every
other plaintiff and each defendant. Even if the plan resolved some
issues common to all plaintiffs, a huge amount of time would have
been taken up with the issues of injury, causation, and damages
involving a single plaintiff, with thirty-two more individual cases
remaining for trial.
Accordingly, it seemed to me that a better plan would involve a
separate trial to decide, as a first step, those dispositive issues common
to every plaintiffs case before considering the morass of scientific,
technical, medical, and causation evidence and the complicated issues
of damages. Under this approach, the suggested trial of dispositive
issues would involve whether the defendants used and disposed of
TCE and whether it was foreseeable that TCE could reach and even-
tually contaminate the wells before they closed in May 1979.82 If the
defendants had not used or disposed of TCE, if it was not foreseeable
that any such disposal could cause harm to the plaintiffs, or if the
groundwater had not reached the wells before they closed in May
1979, no claim of any plaintiff could be sustained and there would be
no need to continue the trial on the lengthy and difficult issues of cau-
sation and damages. However, if there was foreseeability and if the
defendants had disposed of TCE into the groundwater that had
reached the wells before May 1979, the case would then proceed to the
issues involving injuries and medical causation, and thereafter to the
issues involving damages.
After argument, Judge Skinner decided to divide the trial into
three phases.83 The first phase, which he dubbed the "waterworks"
81. See Plaintiffs Trial Plan: A Modified Test Case (dated Jan. 15, 1986), Anderson v.
Cryovac, Inc., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982), reprinted in GROSSMAN &
VAUGHN, supra note 3, at 535.
82. See Beatrice's Memorandum Concerning Trial of Dispositive Issues (dated Jan. 15,
1986), Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982), reprinted
in GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 3, at 531.
83. Unlike the scene in the movie, Judge Skinner's adoption of a trial plan similar to that
put forth by Beatrice did not come instantaneously in a short chambers conference, but after the
submission of written trial plans, and the court's careful consideration of them, aided by the
1999]
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phase, took almost four and one-half months to try. Thus, my earlier
estimate of one year or more for the entire trial was not as unrealistic
as the plaintiffs' had contended. At the end of the first phase, Judge
Skinner put four special interrogatories to the jury. The first special
interrogatory in effect asked whether Beatrice had used and disposed
of TCE after August 1968, and whether the TCE had traveled via the
groundwater from the Beatrice property to the wells before they closed
in May 1979. The jury answered "no" to Special Interrogatory No. 1,
thereby finding Beatrice not liable, 4 and ending the case as to Bea-
trice.
At the time, I fully understood the plaintiffs' disagreement with
Judge Skinner's procedural decision to try the case in three phases.
My own experience informed me that any plaintiffs counsel would
likely have been displeased. But I did not concur, then or now, with
the melodramatic charge that the judge had "cut the heart" or had
taken "the humanity" out of the case."5 This convenient rhetoric not
only disregards Judge Skinner's responsibility to manage fairly a com-
plex and high-profile case, and to avoid emotion and sympathy as a
basis for its resolution, but also ignores the fact that the jury was
aware, from the first day of trial and even earlier, of the human issues
and the "humanity" involved in the case. First, the jury was aware,
from the pretrial publicity about the deaths and injuries to the fami-
lies, that these were heart-rending human tragedies. Furthermore,
this knowledge was reinforced by the plaintiffs' counsel's powerful
and unrestricted opening statement about the deaths and injuries,
which dramatically emphasized the human issues with a power that
doubtlessly stayed with the jury.
With the best-selling success of A Civil Action (and, to a much
lesser extent, the movie of the same title), there has been a renewed
public and academic interest in the Anderson case and Judge Skinner's
trifurcation order. Although never challenged or appealed at the time,
the order has been retroactively claimed by plaintiffs and others as the
inequity that destroyed the "humanity" of the plaintiffs' case. Con-
trary to these recent shrill arguments, Judge Skinner's decision to try
dispositive issues first was not a death knell, nor even a decision elimi-
nating the human issues of the case, and was not necessarily so consid-
ered at the time the decision was made.
arguments of counsel.
84. See infra Part IV.C.
85. These or similar comments on the effect of Judge Skinner's decision have been
advanced by those who opposed or disagreed with that decision.
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I have little doubt that the plaintiffs' counsel would probably
have preferred to put the plaintiffs on the stand as the first series of
witnesses. Although these witnesses had no information or expertise
on the scientific or medical issues that controlled the case, their testi-
mony about their injuries or their loss of loved ones would have had
an undoubted emotional impact on the jury. However, this would not
necessarily have been the unequivocal advantage that the plaintiffs
anticipated. Once the plaintiffs completed their testimony, there
would not have been much more "humanity" in the case, and only the
long and technical "waterworks" phase would have remained to con-
sume endless days of trial on scientific issues on which the defendants
could present strong evidence and mount effective cross-examination.
On the other hand, although the trifurcation order meant that the
plaintiffs would not be the first witnesses, their testimony was not
being denied or excluded, but only deferred until the stage of the trial
after the jury had decided the basic scientific facts that were prerequi-
site foundations to every plaintiffs claim. I observed that plaintiffs'
counsel, despite arguing to the contrary, could see some advantage in
this alternative sequence of testimony because they were highly confi-
dent that their impressive array of experts would be successful in the
"waterworks" phase. Once this major battle of the scientific experts
had beer. won, the plaintiffs would then have been able to present the
"humanity" of their case in a very persuasive and nonrebuttable form
in the second and third phases.86
In those phases, the sympathetic plaintiffs would fully testify,
and the two defendants would have been left in the unenviable and
untenable position of cross-examining grieving parents and sick and
injured men, women, and children who had consumed contaminated
water from the town wells (which, according to the first phase deci-
sion, had been contaminated by groundwater from the defendants'
properties). In this way, the plaintiffs would be telling their sympa-
thetic stories to a sympathetic jury that had already decided the scien-
tific issues in the plaintiffs' favor. This indeed would have given the
plaintiffs a powerful tactical advantage. Thus, even though theplaintiffs fought to have their trial plan adopted, they were disap-
86. In the movie (but not the book), plaintiffs' counsel is seen advising Anne Anderson that
his order of witnesses would be to offer the scientific evidence first, followed by the medical evi-
dence and her testimony. Given the movie's lack of accuracy and excess of fiction, this conver-
sation may never have occurred.
87. Had the plaintiffs continued or retried the case against Grace, they would have been
able to utilize this advantage. That they did not do so cannot be attributed to the trifurcation
order, but to their financial problems, which are dramatically detailed in both the book and the
movie. See, e.g., HARR, supra note 15, at 322, 347-50, 418, 434-36.
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pointed, but not in despair, when Judge Skinner ruled that the dis-
positive issues involving the use and disposal of the chemicals and
groundwater movement to the wells would be tried first, with injuries,
medical causation, and damages to follow.
B. Lessons to Be Taught by A Civil Action: Part Five
Judge Skinner's trifurcation order was an intelligent and sound
technique to manage an enormously complex case and to ensure that
the case was decided on the facts, rather than on sympathy or exasper-
ated confusion. Not only did it save time and judicial resources, but it
presented the case in an orderly way dealing with first things first.
Had the case begun with months of testimony about sickness, injury,
and death (which were issues of medical causation and damages), it
would have been nearly impossible for the jury to have considered,
fairly and dispassionately, the basic scientific prerequisites which, as a
matter of fairness, logic and necessity, had to precede any finding of
causation or any assessment of damages.
In fact, the outcome of the first phase of the trial was the best
evidence of the wisdom and judgment of Judge Skinner's trifurcation
order. As a result of its answers to Special Interrogatory No. 1, the
jury exonerated Beatrice, and Beatrice was dismissed from the case.
Thus, the trial judge's order worked as Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 42(a) intended,88 by reducing the length and complexity of the
case, by having the case decided on the facts, not emotion, and by
allowing a defendant who was not liable to be dismissed from further
participation in a long and complex case in which it never belonged in
the first place.89
C. The Significance of Special Interrogatory No. I
Under Rule 49(a), Judge Skinner was permitted to submit special
verdicts (or special interrogatories, as they were styled in Anderson) to
the jury seeking written findings on specific issues of fact. Judge
Skinner's use of special verdicts on the issues in the first phase of the
case was not only logical, but imperative in order to permit the jury to
deliberate in a fair and orderly way and to understand what the jury
had decided.
With the full participation of all counsel, Judge Skinner ulti-
mately formulated four special interrogatories, which have since
88. Rule 42(a) gives the court power, "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice
or... when conducive to expedition and economy," to order a separate trial of any separate
claim, "or of any separate issue." FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
89. See supra Part 111.G.
[Vol. 23:243
Truth, Myth, and Irony in A Civil Action
become targets for discussion and controversy, the blanket charge
against all four special interrogatories being that they were too com-
plex and confusing for the jury to understand. However, this was not
true of Special Interrogatory No. 1, which asked if the plaintiffs "had
established by a preponderance of the evidence that [TCE] was dis-
posed on Beatrice land after August 27, 1968, [the date of the well
driller's letter], and had substantially contributed to the contamination
of the wells before May 22, 1979 [the date the wells closed]." The
plaintiffs did not object to Special Interrogatory No. 1 and, in fact, had
suggested its compound nature. 9° The jury had been instructed and
understood well that the case had been divided into phases and that if
their answer to Special Interrogatory No. 1 in the first phase was "no,"
the case against Beatrice would end. In fact, there had been instruc-
tions to this effect at the beginning as well as at the end of the case.
Whatever might have been the complexities of the last three spe-
cial interrogatories, the first special interrogatory, which was basic to
the entire case, was not difficult to understand and could be answered
"yes" or "no" by the jury on the evidence before it. As to Beatrice, the
jury's answer was "no" and the case against Beatrice properly ended
there. Moreover, any possible challenge to the nature and form of
Special Interrogatory No. 1 was resolved by the court of appeals,
which affirmed the jury's verdict and denied and dismissed the first
appeal.91
V. THE ABSENCE OF SETTLEMENT OR MEDIATION
A. The Missed Opportunities
I am often asked why the Anderson case did not settle or why it
was not subject to some form of Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR), such as mediation. As to ADR, the answer is simple: these
procedures were not then as well known or widely used as they are
today. In fact, the words "mediation" or "ADR" were never uttered
by any of the parties, nor were these approaches ever suggested. Fur-
thermore, in all likelihood, the plaintiffs would not have been amena-
ble to them under the unusual circumstances of this unusual case.
As to settlement (speaking from Beatrice's perspective), I was
never able to obtain any specific figure or demand from the plaintiffs
90. See Memorandum and Order on Defendant Beatrice Food Co.'s Motion for Immediate
Entry of Final Judgment Under Rule 54(b) (dated Sept. 17, 1986), Anderson v. W.R. Grace &
Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3, 1982), posted at <http://www.law.fsu.edu/
library/faculty/gore/index.html>.
91. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 922, 933 (1st Cir. 1988).
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in the four and one-half year period that preceded the sumptuous
breakfast spread at the Four Seasons Hotel in Boston held early in
1986, very close to the then scheduled trial date. At an earlier point in
the case, I had tried to begin settlement talks with plaintiffs' counsel
and had actually suggested an amount close to one million dollars.92
The plaintiffs did not consider my suggestion acceptable, nor did they
respond with a counteroffer. Rather, plaintiffs' responded by counsel
insisting that there be a "process," which was never defined, and that
discussions had to be with the "decision-makers," which I assumed
meant the actual corporate executives, even though I was their repre-
sentative, whose recommendation was likely to be accepted. Because
simply making an offer was not apparently considered part of a "proc-
ess," and I was apparently not considered a "decision-maker," settle-
ment was not broached by me (or to me) again.
As the trial date approached, Judge Skinner told the plaintiffs to
provide the defendants with a realistic settlement figure. In response,
the plaintiffs prepared the elaborate and highly choreographed pro-
ceedings at the Four Seasons. Because it was close to the trial date, it
was time to talk realistically. Instead, the plaintiffs' counsel delivered
a lengthy speech about the defendants' conduct and responsibilities,
and the plaintiffs' financial advisor then presented explanations and
figures concerning the millions of dollars required to provide annual
payments to each family for thirty years, the millions to establish
research foundations, and the millions to be paid immediately in a
lump sum.93
The plaintiffs' proposal at the Four Seasons breakfast was so far
from an understandable and realistic settlement figure, so contrary to
what the judge had ordered, and so foreign to my idea of settling the
case, that there was no point whatever in discussing it, and I left.
After that, I had nothing to do with settlement, but returned to the
imminent business of preparing a difficult and complex case. The
settlement meeting at the Four Seasons is accurately described in the
book, A Civil Action,94 and is more or less accurately portrayed in the
movie. However, I do not know and did not observe whether the
92. HARR, supra note 15, at 230.
93. Id. at 278, 274-76. Presumably, the overall purpose of both presentations was intended
to be some sort of structured settlement proposal. In recent seminar discussions about the case
in 1999, one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs indicated that the purpose of the breakfast was
supposed to have been to suggest a $175 million demand, which was to be considered as an invi-
tation to provide a counteroffer. I received no such impression at the time. In fact, A Civil
Action reports that at least one of plaintiffs' counsel was concerned that making a settlement
presentation with such grandiose demands would cause the defendants to walk out, which is
exactly what happened. HARR, supra note 15, at 274, 276.
94. Id. at 277-80.
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partners of plaintiffs' counsel exhibited the disdain and astonishment
at his conduct that the movie indicates.9"
The plaintiffs had a final opportunity for settlement literally on
the eve of trial. On the Friday before the Monday in March 1986
when the trial was to start, Beatrice's Assistant General Counsel (who
was clearly a "decision-maker") and my partner, Neil Jacobs, met with
plaintiffs' counsel. At that time, it was suggested to plaintiffs' counsel
that if something in the vicinity of one million dollars for each of the
eight families was acceptable to plaintiffs, Mr. Jacobs would recom-
mend it.96
To a seasoned trial lawyer with extensive knowledge and experi-
ence in the language of settlement, Mr. Jacobs' suggestion should have
been a signal that, if the plaintiffs indicated that they would accept
such a sum, it was likely that Beatrice would have followed its coun-
sel's recommendation. The seasoned trial lawyer would also have
known that the occasion was not intended as the start of a bargaining
session. The trial was to begin the following Monday morning and,
after almost five years of litigation, it was time for the plaintiffs' coun-
sel to fish or cut bait on settlement.
Even at the eleventh hour meeting with Mr. Jacobs and Bea-
trice's Assistant General Counsel, plaintiffs' counsel was not ready to
indicate an acceptance in principle or to state a willingness to recom-
mend Mr. Jacobs' suggestion to the clients as a framework for settle-
ment. Nor was he ready, then and there, to say what final figure the
clients would accept, although there had been many years to consider
the matter. That night, the plaintiffs' counsel called back and said
that their "bottom line" to settle the case against Beatrice was $18
million, 97 which Mr. Jacobs indicated was totally unacceptable (a fact
that A Civil Action does not report). Never before had this figure or
anything remotely close to it, been mentioned. Now, literally on the
eve of trial, the figure appeared to be nothing more than an attempt at
old fashioned bargaining, with a "bottom line" that plaintiffs' counsel
knew would be too much and too late, as indeed it was.
95. The later movie scene, in which I appear to be offering plaintiffs' counsel $20 million in
a courthouse corridor while awaiting the verdict, is pure fiction and never happened. HARR,
supra note 15, at 231.
96. I was not at that meeting, and I understand that it is slightly misdescribed in A Civil
Action. However, the suggestion of one million dollars per family was floated as a possible basis
for immediate settlement, not as an invitation for bargaining. It was far too late for that.
97. Id. at 290.
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B. Lessons to Be Taught by A Civil Action: Part Six
According to A Civil Action, the settlement suggestion made by
Mr. Jacobs was not discussed by plaintiffs' counsel with his clients
(some of whom may possibly have favored it).98 A Civil Action makes
no comment on this failure to transmit information to the clients, but
appears to justify it because plaintiffs' counsel had not received a
legally binding offer.99 That conclusion was technically correct as a
matter of contract law. However, such a suggestion by Mr. Jacobs
would usually be understood by attorneys representing plaintiffs as a
reliable guidepost on a trail, which, if quickly followed, would lead to
settlement. Nevertheless, A Civil Action does not recognize this prac-
tical reality, nor make any critical or other comment on the alleged
failure to discuss the matter with the clients, whether there had been a
legal offer or not.
On the other hand, A Civil Action appears critical of Mr. Jacobs
for not calling plaintiffs' counsel back to reject the eighteen million
dollar "bottom line" proposal or discuss settlement further.' 0 The
implication appears to be that settlement was somehow impeded or
might otherwise have occurred. No such additional call or response
by Mr. Jacobs was necessary. Not only did Mr. Jacobs indicate during
the call from plaintiffs' counsel that the plaintiffs' "bottom line" was
unacceptable, but the timing and context of the figure suggested by
Mr. Jacobs at the meeting should have made it obvious that a "bottom
line" counteroffer, which more than doubled Mr. Jacobs' suggestion,
would be rejected. Indeed, it was even more obvious from the silence
that followed the plaintiffs' counsel's call.'
A Civil Action makes no point about the plaintiffs' counsel's fail-
ure to recognize that the time for bargaining had long since past and
that if there were to be a large last-minute settlement from Beatrice
(which apparently the plaintiffs desperately needed to continue the
case against Grace), it would have to be at or near Mr. Jacobs' sug-
gested amount. Nor, for that matter, does A Civil Action indicate (or
wonder) where the authority for the plaintiffs' eighteen million dollar




101. In the movie scene where, at a later date, the plaintiffs' law firm is discussing Grace's
eight million dollar settlement offer, plaintiffs' counsel is strongly chastised by his financial advi-
sor for being willing to accept only an amount that counsel knew Grace would not offer.
Whether this movie scene is accurate or not, similar conversations appear to have taken place,
according to the book. See id. at 416-18.
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bargaining, the trial was about to begin, and the risk remained that the
plaintiffs would receive nothing. 102
The issue was moot, however, because of the unrealistic attempt
to double the suggested settlement figure that came far too late and
was far too much.10 3 Whether or not there was an obligation to trans-
mit Mr. Jacobs' suggestion to the plaintiffs, an opportunity was lost.
No settlement with Beatrice was ever achieved; the trial went forward,
and Beatrice was found not liable.
VI. THE RESPECT DUE THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. The Myth That the System Did Not Work
Following the publication of A Civil Action, I often heard the
broadside charge that the system "did not work," or that "justice" was
not done. Even today, there are those who continue to make that
charge. But reviewing the court materials and analyzing the facts and
important procedural issues in the Anderson case clearly shows other-
wise and plainly refutes such uninformed rhetoric.
From the initial pleadings to the posttrial motions and beyond,
the court materials in Anderson (many of which are reproduced in the
new book, A Documentary Companion to A Civil Action) reveal the
true picture of the system at work. As I have already noted, the plain-
tiffs prevailed against every dispositive motion seeking to have the case
thrown out of court. These were not routine motions routinely denied
but, on the contrary, presented difficult issues and serious dangers for
the plaintiffs' case. In addition, the plaintiffs were provided with sev-
enty-eight days in court, followed by eight and a half days of jury
deliberation, which distinguished between the liability of two corpo-
102. After the publication of A Civil Action, and in recent seminars or panel discussions, I
have been informed that the huge sums being borrowed from Bank of Boston and spent by the
plaintiffs on the case were part of an elaborate strategy to show the defendants that the plaintiffs
were well supplied with money and could aggressively challenge and impress the two large law
firms that opposed them. The strategy envisaged was that once one of the defendants was con-
vinced of that fact, it would settle, and the plaintiffs would use the settlement amount to con-
tinue the case against the remaining defendant. Only part of the strategy worked-the part that
convinced the defendants that the plaintiffs were extremely well financed and willing to spend
enormous amounts of money on the case. Not achieving the other part, however, was clearly a
missed opportunity for the plaintiffs. Similarly, A Civil Action misses the opportunity to com-
ment on or criticize the plaintiffs' settlement strategies, although it notes, in favorable terms,
some of plaintiffs' counsel's successful actions. See, e.g., id. at 357, 344; supra notes 30, 44, 59.
103. I did not personally participate in these last minute settlement negotiations and might
not have agreed with the suggestion made by Mr. Jacobs and Beatrice's Assistant General Coun-
sel. Nevertheless, even when liability is highly unlikely, there are always valid business reasons
why a client may choose to avoid litigation and settle an otherwise long and expensive (but win-
nable) case.
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rate defendants, finding one defendant, Beatrice, not liable, while
permitting the case against another defendant, Grace, to proceed to
phase two. Later, a new trial for Grace was ordered and the case
settled for eight million dollars without further court proceedings. °4
The lengthy jury trial in Anderson was preceded by four years of
pretrial proceedings with intensive judicial oversight. There were also
extensive posttrial proceedings, including a twenty-three day special
evidentiary inquiry about the Yankee Report, Riley's removal activi-
ties, and plaintiffs accusations of conspiratorial activities.' Finally,
there were two appeals to the First Circuit, where Judge Skinner's
findings were accepted, his well supported recommendations adopted,
and the judgment for Beatrice ultimately affirmed.
Those who demean juries and those who cynically complain
about the civil justice system should reflect on the broad panoply of
procedural opportunities, advantages, and safeguards in Anderson
when they charge that "justice" was not done or that the plaintiffs
were thwarted by the system. I suggest that those who make these
charges should study the trial record and the Anderson court materials
closely, and should recognize that justice, if it is to have any meaning
at all, must be a two-way street that provides justice not only for
plaintiffs, but for defendants as well. If the book, A Civil Action, has
left the impression that justice was not done, this itself is an injustice,
and one which this Article has attempted to correct.
I offer a similar reaction to those who claim that the Anderson
trial did not search for "the truth," or did not reveal "the truth." In
contrast to this useless emotional rhetoric, or the partisan view of A
Civil Action, the student or lawyer who reviews the record (or who
studies the materials in such volumes as A Documentary Companion to
A Civil Action) should consider whether a trial is, in fact, a vehicle for
104. HARR, supra note 15, at 448, 451.
105. After the special evidentiary inquiry was complete, Judge Skinner received further
affidavits from Riley's counsel about the nonproduction of the Yankee Report and Beatrice's
counsel's role, particularly as to when the Report was first seen by Beatrice's counsel. These
affidavits became the basis for at least four more accusatory motions by plaintiffs' counsel, again
seeking serious sanctions and other dire consequences such as disqualification and default. At
hearings on these motions, the affidavits from Riley's counsel, as well as counter-affidavits, were
considered by Judge Skinner, who was to review them "line-by-line." See Hearing, Nov. 15,
1989, at 51, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 3,
1982). In his Final Report, he recommended denial of all plaintiffs' motions, making the signifi-
cant statement that "even with all the recent revelations," there was still no credible evidence that
the tannery had disposed of TCE. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods, Co., 129 F.R.D. 394, 402 (D.
Mass. 1989). Thus, the later affidavits from Riley's counsel never affected the basic issue of the
special evidentiary inquiry, whether the nonproduction of the Report substantially interfered
with the plaintiffs' (nonexistent) tannery case, or the basic issue of the trial, whether the tannery
had ever used or disposed of TCE. See supra Part III.G.
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revealing some kind of single uncontrovertible "truth" or, as many
lawyers, judges, and writers believe, a fair and efficient means of
resolving disputes by finding facts and applying the law.
To those who still insist that the Anderson trial did not reveal
"the truth," the challenge remains: how and where is their "truth" to
be found? Whose "truth" will be revealed? Whose "truth" must be
accepted? Is it the plaintiff's truth? The defendant's truth? The law-
yer's truth? The witness's truth? The judge's truth? The public's
truth? The media's truth? The government's truth? Whatever the
responses to these abstract puzzles, a trial confronts lawyers, litigants
and the civil justice system, not with an ongoing philosophical debate,
but with a present real life controversy that must be immediately and
efficiently resolved on the facts, the evidence, and the law. In light of
that reality, a fair trial in a fair adversarial system, even with all its
imperfections, not only resolves the existing controversy but, I believe,
is still the best system yet devised for finding that elusive and unde-
fined concept called "truth." Despite the unjustified but still lingering
doubts implied in A Civil Action, those students and lawyers who
understand and respect the importance of process, procedure, and fact
finding in the civil justice system will come to appreciate that truth is a
product, not a victim of that system.
B. The Rhetoric That "Legal Technicalities" Interfere with "Justice"
For as long as I have practiced, I have heard the charge that law-
yers use objections, motions, process, procedure, and other so-called
"technicalities" to harass or disrupt their opponents' cases and to
defeat "truth" and "justice." More often than not, it is a disappointed
litigant or an uninformed member of the press or public who makes
the charge. To the extent that A Civil Action seems to imply or
endorse similar observations, I wholly disagree with any such point of
view. What A Civil Action does not appreciate, but good students and
good lawyers come to realize (and volumes like A Documentary Com-
panion to A Civil Action help to teach), is that the rules of evidence,
the rules of procedure, and a respect for process are not "technicali-
ties" to be ignored or abused, but wise restraints that the civil justice
system uses to exclude improper evidence or unfair procedures, and
thereby to ensure fairness and prevent injustice.
When the rules of evidence and procedure and their application
to court materials in real life trials are examined, the inquiring student
may well discover, as the record in Anderson will indicate, the
improper question that prompted the objection, the reasoned argu-
ment that supported the actions of the court or counsel, and the
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reasonable policy behind the challenged procedure. So it was in
Anderson. No one associated with the Anderson case would deny that
it was long, complex, technical, and replete with procedural issues.
But it was not decided by any unfair "technicalities" and, whatever the
implications of A Civil Action to the contrary, I believe that those who
examine the case closely, using a lawyer's knowledge, skills, instincts,
and analysis will reach the same conclusion.
C. The Reality That Liability Must Be Based on Fault
I am always surprised by those who can comfortably rush to the
conclusion that a "deep pocket" defendant, once accused of wrong-
doing, must or should somehow be liable for a plaintiffs serious per-
sonal injuries. These conclusions abound in the public's view of the
Anderson case and, to some extent, have been encouraged by A Civil
Action. Those who reach these conclusions-whether motivated by
sympathy, compassion, outrage, or lack of understanding-ignore or
do not care about the requirements of the civil justice system and the
necessity to prove that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiffs
injuries.
In Anderson, the plaintiffs brought their claim to the civil justice
system for resolution by a jury on the facts and the law. Their lawyers
knew that, in that system, liability is based on fault, that fault is estab-
lished by evidence, and that no loss can be shifted from an injured
party to a defendant without first showing that the defendant's con-
duct caused that loss. It remains one of the basic principles of our
civil justice system that no party should pay for losses it did not cause,
no matter how serious or heartbreaking the injury. In Anderson, that
basic principle was reaffirmed by the very system the plaintiffs chose
to decide their dispute.
10 6
VII. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The goal of "thinking like a lawyer," though often demeaned as a
cliche, remains a high purpose and a difficult achievement for stu-
dents, law professors, and practicing lawyers. A Civil Action does not
106. However, for many readers of A Civil Action, this principle appears to be irrelevant.
Instead they substitute their own allegedly higher moral code of conduct or sense of outrage to
pronounce the defendants liable. As an illustration of this point, the question is often asked of
me, "Beatrice owned contaminated property, why were they not liable to the plaintiffs?" The
answer is that in the tort system, the plaintiff must also prove negligence and causation before
the plaintiffs' loss shifts to the defendant. By contrast, the EPA, in administrative proceedings,
has the power to impose clean-up costs on defendants, based on ownership of the property and
without the necessity of proving negligence. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994). This is not the stan-
dard for a civil suit seeking substantial tort damages for personal injuries.
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aspire to or intend any such purpose, nor does the Anderson case stand
for or provide any universal truth or moral principle to guide a stu-
dent, professor, or practitioner. At base, Anderson was indeed just a
civil action, not unlike (except in subject matter and notoriety) thou-
sands of other important or complex civil cases tried all over the
United States. Nonetheless, A Civil Action, when used with court
materials in the Anderson case and the materials and commentary in
volumes such as A Documentary Companion to A Civil Action, can
make a valuable contribution to legal education by helping the student
to appreciate the ambiguity and complexity of civil litigation; the sig-
nificance of procedure and process; the need to question assumptions,
challenge rhetoric, and avoid snap judgments; and, above all, the cru-
cial importance of facts in the search for truth. With these lessons
learned, the student can begin, with some confidence, the long and
challenging journey toward the goals of thinking like a lawyer and
understanding and appreciating the nature of justice in the civil justice
system.
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